TO DEFENDANT CITY OF LOS ANGELES AND TO ITS ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on January 19, 1999 at 8:30 a.m. or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard in Department 64 of the above entitled court, located at 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, California, Plaintiff Eugene F. Quinn will move this court for an order awarding Plaintiff his attorney’s fees in the amount of $609,763.00 as the prevailing party in this action. This figure is based on the lodestar value of Plaintiff’s attorney’s fees (attorneys’ hourly rates times hours worked), times a requested multiplier of 2.0 to compensate Plaintiff for the risk of non-payment, the inevitable delay in receiving payment, and to encourage Plaintiff’s attorneys and other civil rights attorneys to undertake public interest litigation of similar importance in the future.

The motion is made on the ground that Plaintiff, as the prevailing party, is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to Government Code §12965(b).

The motion is based on this notice of motion, the accompanying memorandum of points and authorities, the attached declaration of Paul A. Greenberg, the declarations of Stuart P. Herman, Fred T. Ashley, Joseph Posner and Virgil L. Roth served and filed herewith, the papers and records on file herein, and on such other oral and documentary evidence as may be presented at the hearing of the motion.

DATED: December , 1998 LAW OFFICES OF PAUL A. GREENBERG

PAUL A. GREENBERG

IRIS WEINMANN

Attorneys for Plaintiff EUGENE QUINN

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. Introduction.

This action arises out of the termination of Plaintiff Eugene Quinn from his employment as a police officer with the Los Angeles Police Department. The City of Los Angeles terminated Plaintiff because of a hearing impairment, and the jury found that in so terminating him, the City of Los Angeles violated the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, which requires reasonable accommodation of an individual’s physical disability.

On October 15, 1998, this Court entered Judgment against the City of Los Angeles and in favor of Plaintiff pursuant to the jury’s verdict in the amount of $200,000. The judgment herein establishes Plaintiff as the prevailing party, entitling him to an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to the Fair Employment and Housing Act. Plaintiff seeks to recover attorney’s fees in the amount of $609,763.00 as the prevailing party in this action. This figure is based on the lodestar value of Plaintiff’s attorney’s fees (attorneys’ hourly rates times hours worked), times a requested multiplier of 2.0 to compensate Plaintiff for the risk of non-payment, the inevitable delay in receiving payment, and to encourage Plaintiff’s attorneys and other civil rights attorneys to undertake public interest litigation of similar importance in the future.

II. Plaintiff Is Entitled To His Attorney’s Fees As The Prevailing Party In This Litigation.

The California Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA") specifically provides that a party prevailing in an action brought under that act is entitled to recover her or her reasonable attorney’s fees. Gov’t Code §12965(b). TA \l "Gov’t Code §12965(b)." \s "Gov’t Code §12965(b)." \c 2 Government Code Section 12965(b) provides in pertinent part as follows:

"In actions brought under this section, the court, in its discretion may award to the prevailing party reasonable attorneys fees and costs¼ "

The rationale for allowing attorneys’ fees in employment discrimination actions is to make it easier for a plaintiff of limited means to bring a meritorious suit to vindicate a public policy "that Congress considered of the highest priority." Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC (1978) 434 U.S. 412, 418, 98 S. Ct. 694, 699, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 TA \l "Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC

(1978) 434 U.S. 412, 98 S. Ct. 694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648" \s "Christianburg" \c 1 . A plaintiff who brings an anti-discrimination lawsuit does so in the role of a private attorney general to vindicate this policy considered by Congress to be of the greatest importance. Id. at 416-417, 98 S. Ct. at 698 TA \s "Christianburg" . See also Cummings v. Benco Bldg. Services (1992) 11 Cal. App. 4th 1383, 1387, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 53, 55 TA \l "Cummings v. Benco Bldg. Services

(1992) 11 Cal. App. 4th 1383, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 53" \s "Cummings" \c 1 .

Thus, the cases uniformly hold that a prevailing plaintiff in a discrimination action "should ordinarily recover an attorney’s fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust." Cummings TA \s "Cummings" , supra, at 1387, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 55. Here, there are no special circumstances that would render an award of attorneys’ fees unjust. This Court should therefore properly exercise its authority to award Plaintiff attorney’s fees as the prevailing party in this action.

III. The Lodestar Value of the Attorney’s Fees Incurred Has Been Appropriately Established.

In calculating attorney’s fees under the Fair Employment and Housing Act, the court should follow the lodestar approach adopted by the California Supreme Court in Serrano v. Priest (Serrano III) (1977) 20 Cal. 3d 25, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315 TA \l "Serrano v. Priest (Serrano III)

(1977) 20 Cal. 3d 25, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315" \s "Serrano III" \c 1 . Crommie v. California Public Utilities Comm’n (N.D. Cal. 1994) 840 F. Supp. 719, 724 TA \l "Crommie v. California Public Utilities Comm’n

(N.D. Cal. 1994) 840 F. Supp. 719" \s "Crommie" \c 1 , aff’d sub nom Mangold v. California Public Utilities Comm’n (9th Cir. 1995) 67 F.3d 1470. Under the lodestar method, the court obtains the lodestar amount by multiplying the hours worked by a reasonable hourly rate. Serrano III TA \s "Serrano III" , supra, at 48, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 328; Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1983) 34 Cal. 3d 311, 321-322, 193 Cal. Rptr. 900, 906 TA \l "Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc.

(1983) 34 Cal. 3d 311, 193 Cal. Rptr. 900" \s "Press" \c 1 . The lodestar amount may then be increased by applying a multiplier. Id. TA \s "Serrano III"

A. The Number of Hours Expended by Plaintiff’s Counsel Was Reasonable.

The first step in the calculation of the lodestar is determining the number of hours reasonably expended in the litigation. Crommie TA \s "Crommie" , supra, at 724. Reasonable hours include, in addition to time spent during litigation, the following: (a) time spent before the action is filed, including time reasonably spent interviewing the client, investigating the facts and the law, and preparing the initial pleadings, as well as time spent in exhausting administrative remedies New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey (1980) 447 U.S. 54, 62, 100 S.Ct. 2024, 2030, 64 L.Ed.2d 723 TA \l "New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey

(1980) 447 U.S. 54, 100 S.Ct. 2024, 64 L.Ed.2d 723" \s "New York Gaslight" \c 1 ; Stokus v. Marsh (1990) 217 Cal. App. 3d 647, 655-656, 266 Cal. Rptr. 90, 95 TA \l "Stokus v. Marsh

(1990) 217 Cal. App. 3d 647, 266 Cal. Rptr. 90" \s "Stokus" \c 1 ; and (b) time spent in preparing and litigating the fee application. Serrano v. Unruh (Serrano IV) (1982) 32 Cal. 3d 621, 624, 186 Cal. Rptr. 754, 754-755 TA \l "Serrano v. Unruh (Serrano IV)

(1982) 32 Cal. 3d 621, 186 Cal. Rptr. 754" \s "Serrano IV" \c 1 .

Here, the records submitted in support of this motion reflect that Plaintiff’s counsel reasonably expended the following number of hours in the prosecution of this case:

Attorney

Hours Billed

Paul A. Greenberg:

495.45

Iris Weinmann:

533.45

Josh Erlich:

94.1

Total Hours:

=SUM(ABOVE) 1123.00

A breakdown of the allocation of these hours to the various stages of the litigation follows:

1. Pre-Litigation Hours: (Includes Exhausting Administrative Remedies, and Preparing and Filing Complaint)

Attorney

Time Billed

Hourly Rate

Total

Paul A. Greenberg

25.90

$350

$9065.00

Iris Weinmann

19.50

$220

$4290.00

Josh Erlich

0

$150

0

2. Pre-Trial Litigation Hours:

A. Discovery (Includes Propounding and Responding to Discovery, Preparing For, Attending, and Conducting Depositions, Engaging in Meet and Confer Process, and Filing Motions to Compel):

Attorney

Time Billed

Hourly Rate

Total

Paul A. Greenberg

47.60

$350

$16,660.00

Iris Weinmann

102.90

$220

$22,638.00

Josh Erlich

16.90

$150

$2535.00

B. Trial Preparation (Includes Time Spent Preparing Pre Trial Documents, Such as Jury Instructions, Witness Lists, Exhibit Lists, Trial Brief, etc. and Preparing for Jury Selection, Opening Statement, etc.)

Attorney

Time Billed

Hourly Rate

Total

Paul A. Greenberg

139.30

$350

$48,755.00

Iris Weinmann

163.90

$220

$36,058.00

Josh Erlich

30.10

$150

$4515.00

C. Other Pre-Litigation (Includes Miscellaneous Time Such as Opposing Demurrer, Conducting Research, Locating and Retaining Experts, and Court Appearances for Settlement Conferences and Pre-Trial Motions)

Attorney

Time Billed

Hourly Rate

Total

Paul A. Greenberg

38.80

$350

$13,580.00

Iris Weinmann

55.15

$220

$12,133.00

Josh Erlich

36.80

$150

$5520.00

3. Trial Hours: (Includes Court Time in Trial and Trial Preparation)

Attorney

Time Billed

Hourly Rate

Total

Paul A. Greenberg

197.30

$350

$69,055.00

Iris Weinmann

143.00

$220

$31,460.00

Josh Erlich

3.50

$150

$525.00

4. Post-Trial Hours: (Includes Opposing Defendant’s Motion for New Trial and Motion for JNOV, and Preparing Memorandum of Costs)

Attorney

Time Billed

Hourly Rate

Total

Paul A. Greenberg

35.20

$350

$12,320.00

Iris Weinmann

33.50

$220

$7370.00

Josh Erlich

6.80

$150

$1020.00

5. Fee Application Hours: (Includes Time Spent in Researching and Drafting This Motion for Attorney’s Fees - Does Not Include Time to Prepare Reply Brief or to Appear at Hearing)

Attorney

Time Billed

Hourly Rate

Total

Paul A. Greenberg

11.35

$350

$3972.50

Iris Weinmann

15.50

$220

$3410.00

Josh Erlich

0

$150

0

The Law Offices of Paul A. Greenberg began its representation of Eugene Quinn in September, 1996, more than 2 years prior to achieving its successful verdict. Significant work was performed pre-litigation, including the filing of documents with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing in order to exhaust administrative remedies under the Fair Employment and Housing Act, and filing a claim with the City of Los Angeles, in order to satisfy the prerequisites to filing an action against a municipal entity. Prior to filing the complaint, Plaintiff’s counsel conducted extensive research regarding the disability laws and their specific application to law enforcement agencies. Said research included conferring with other counsel. In fact, Plaintiff’s counsel worked on the case for several months prior to filing the complaint.

Significant amounts of discovery were conducted by Plaintiff regarding both the circumstances of Plaintiff’s employment and the City’s policies in general regarding the employment of law enforcement officers with hearing and other disabilities. The City stonewalled in providing discovery responses and in producing its employees for depositions, requiring Plaintiff’s counsel to make numerous efforts to first meet and confer, in person, by telephone and by correspondence, and ultimately requiring motions to be filed with the Court. When the City ultimately was forced to comply with Plaintiff’s discovery, it produced voluminous documents, including many technical reports regarding hearing standards for law enforcement officers. The review and analysis of these voluminous documents took many hours, but were crucial in Plaintiff’s counsel’s cross-examination of the City’s witnesses, especially the two medical doctors, Dr. Leonard Goldberg and Dr. Jothan Staley, who testified on the City’s behalf, as well as LAPD "brass" including Commander Daniel Schatz, head of personnel, and Lieutenant David J. Gascon, Deputy Chief of Police and Chief of Staff to Police Chief Bernard Parks.

Numerous hours were also spent by Plaintiff’s counsel in locating, retaining and consulting with expert witnesses, and preparing for their testimony at trial. Ultimately, three of the expert witnesses consulted by Plaintiff testified on his behalf at trial, including a former police chief, Melvin Tucker, who provided crucial testimony to rebut the City’s argument that Plaintiff was not qualified to be a police officer and that it could not reasonably accommodate Plaintiff’s disability.

The time expended during trial was also reasonably incurred. Several days were spent in court supervised settlement conferences and pre-trial motions between September 23, 1998 and September 28, 1998. Jury selection began on September 29, and the verdict was reached on October 15. Paul Greenberg and Iris Weinmann were thus in court over an almost three week period of time. The non-court time was spent in coordination and preparation of witnesses, compilation of testimony and evidence adduced during trial, research of issues arising during the trial, and preparing for cross-examination of defense witnesses.

Subsequent to the verdict, the City filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a motion for new trial. The post trial time incurred in opposing these motions, which Plaintiff’s counsel successfully defeated, was also reasonable.

The fact that more than one attorney worked on the case does not mean that their aggregate hours are duplicative or unreasonable. California courts have recognized that multiple counsel is permissible when the demands of the case warrant more than one attorney. In such cases, some duplication of work is both expected and compensable. Margolin v. Regional Planning Comm’n (1982) 134 Cal. App. 3d 999, 1006-1007, 185 Cal. Rptr. 145, 149 TA \l "Margolin v. Regional Planning Comm’n

(1982) 134 Cal. App. 3d 999, 185 Cal. Rptr. 145" \s "Margolin" \c 1 .

As set forth in the declarations submitted herewith, the total number of hours spent on this matter by counsel is reasonable in light of the average time required in litigating similar cases. Thus, Plaintiff is entitled to compensation for all the attorney hours worked in this case.

B. The Hourly Rate Charged for the Services of Plaintiff’s Counsel is Reasonable.

The second step in calculating the lodestar fee amount is setting a reasonable hourly rate. Crommie TA \s "Crommie" , supra, at 724. In determining a reasonable hourly rate, the court may consider "the applicants’ customary billing rates and the prevailing rate charged by attorneys of similar skill and experience for comparable legal services in the community." Id. at 725. As explained in the declarations of Stuart P. Herman and Fred T. Ashley, the current prevailing billing or "market" rates in the Los Angeles area range from $225 to $450 per hour. See Bihun v. AT&T Information Systems, Inc. (1993) 13 Cal. App. 4th 976, 1004-1005, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 787 TA \l "Bihun v. AT&T Information Systems, Inc. (1993) 13 Cal. App. 4th 976, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 787" \s "Bihun" \c 1 (upholding an attorney’s fee award in an action brought under the FEHA based on an hourly rate of $450) (overruled on other grounds in Lakin v. Watkins Assoc. Indus. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 644, 664, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 109). In fact, Paul A. Greenberg was co-trial counsel in a discrimination trial in 1994 with Larry Grassini, whose hourly rate of $450 was validated in Bihun.

Given the skill and experience of the attorneys who represented Plaintiff, an hourly rate of $350 for Paul A. Greenberg, of $220 for Iris Weinmann and $150 for Josh Erlich is reasonable. See Declarations of Joseph Posner, Virgil L. Roth, Fred T. Ashley, Stuart P. Herman and Paul A. Greenberg.

The product of multiplying the number of hours expended by counsel on this case and each respective attorneys’ hourly rate yields the following sums:

Attorney

Hourly Rate

Hours Billed

Total Amount

Paul A. Greenberg:

$350.00

495.45

$173,407.50

Iris Weinmann:

$220.00

533.45

$117,359.00

Josh Erlich:

$150.00

94.1

$14,115.00

Total:

 

=SUM(ABOVE) $304,881.50

Thus, the lodestar fee amount is $304,881.50.

IV. Under California Law, a Multiplier of the Lodestar May Be Awarded To Account for the Successful Result and the Contingent Risk of Litigation.

Once the court establishes the lodestar amount, it may enhance the fee award by a particular multiplier in order to make an appropriate fee award. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano III TA \s "Serrano III" ) (1977) 20 Cal. 3d 25, 48, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315, 328; Press TA \s "Press" v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1983) 34 Cal. 3d 311, 321-322, 193 Cal. Rptr. 900, 906. Several factors may be considered by the court in determining whether to augment the fee award, including but not limited to, the following: (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill displayed in presenting them; (2) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys; (3) the contingent nature of the fee award, both from the point of view of eventual victory on the merits and the point of view of establishing eligibility for an award; (4) the result obtained by the litigation; (5) the quality of the representation; and (6) any delay in receipt of payment. Serrano III, supra, at 48, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 328 TA \s "Serrano III" ; Press, supra, at 321-322, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 906 TA \s "Press" ; City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders (1988) 203 Cal. App. 3d 78, 83, 249 Cal. Rptr. 606, 609 TA \l "City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders

(1988) 203 Cal. App. 3d 78, 249 Cal. Rptr. 606" \s "City of Oakland" \c 1 ; Downey Cares v. Downey Community Dev. Comm’n (1987) 196 Cal. App. 3d 983, 995 n. 11, 242 Cal. Rptr. 272, 279 n. 11 TA \l "Downey Cares v. Downey Community Dev. Comm’n

(1987) 196 Cal. App. 3d 983, 242 Cal. Rptr. 272" \s "Downey Cares" \c 1 .

Applying these factors to the instant action demonstrates that Plaintiff’s counsel should be awarded fees based upon a multiplier of 2.0. In weighing whether or not to represent Plaintiff in this action, it was apparent to Plaintiff’s counsel that this case would be more difficult than other employment discrimination matters he had handled for several reasons. First, because the lawsuit would be against a large police department, it would be a risky case to bring before a jury, due to the deference the public generally gives to police departments who are entrusted to protect public safety. Further, Plaintiff would have the burden of proving that the department’s policies towards officers with hearing impairments were discriminatory, a difficult task given the nature of the job in question, that of a police officer. Moreover, because the Defendant was a public entity, there was no entitlement to punitive damages, thereby significantly lowering the overall damages recoverable even if a successful verdict was achieved. These facts, coupled with the virtually unlimited resources available to the Defendant City, made the decision to take Plaintiff’s case a risky one. In fact, Plaintiff’s counsel was advised by other leading plaintiff’s employment lawyers not to accept Plaintiff’s case.

Additionally, because of the relative youth of the disability laws, there were many novel issues presented in this action, such as the effect of an employee’s probationary status on application of the disability laws, and whether reasonable accommodation included reassignment to another position, or was limited to accommodations which could be provided to the employee in his existing position.

The risk factors unique to Plaintiff’s case were in addition to the normal risk factors which accompany an employment discrimination case. In employment discrimination cases, the employee has significant evidentiary hurdles to overcome, as well as disadvantages in discovering information to support his or her claim. As was the case here, the employer has immediate access to and control of supervisors, co-workers and other witnesses, as well as the documents that the plaintiff needs to prove his or her case.

The risk assumed by Plaintiff’s counsel was compounded by the fact that this case was taken on a contingency basis. Because of the complexity of discrimination cases, there is a dearth of competent counsel available to represent discrimination plaintiffs on a contingency basis. Most individuals could not afford to retain an attorney if they were required to pay on an hourly basis. The financial risks to an attorney accepting a discrimination case on a contingency basis, however, are substantial.

Recognizing the risk incurred by an attorney accepting a case on a contingency basis, California courts have routinely applied a contingent risk multiplier in order to attract attorneys to cases of significant societal importance and compensate for the risk of loss generally present in contingency cases as a class. Beasley v. Wells Fargo Bank (1991) 235 Cal. App. 3d 1407, 1419, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 459, 466 TA \l "Beasley v. Wells Fargo Bank

(1991) 235 Cal. App. 3d 1407, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 459" \s "Beasley" \c 1 . The contingent risk multiplier is used in order to set a fee that is "likely to entice competent counsel to undertake difficult public interest cases." San Bernardino Valley Audubon Society v. County of San Bernardino (1984) 155 Cal. App. 3d 738, 755, 202 Cal. Rptr. 423, 431 TA \l "San Bernardino Valley Audubon Society v. County of San Bernardino

(1984) 155 Cal. App. 3d 738, 202 Cal. Rptr. 423" \s "San Bernardino Valley Audubon Society" \c 1 . The courts have found contingent risk multipliers of 2.0 to be reasonable. See, e.g., Crommie TA \s "Crommie" , supra, at 725 (affirming a multiplier of 2.0 in an age discrimination case brought under FEHA and the ADEA). Plaintiff also requests that this Court take judicial notice of the trial court’s decision to apply a multiplier of 2.0 in Green v. City of Los Angeles, LASC Case No. BC111581 (October 9, 1996) and the trial court’s decision to apply of multiplier of 3.0 in Keiffer v. Bechtel Corp., San Francisco Superior Court Case No. 974305 (February 25, 1997) (see infra).

Employment discrimination lawsuits serve a significant public benefit - the eradication of discrimination in the workplace. It is entirely appropriate and indeed necessary for a multiplier to be applied in employment discrimination actions such as the case at bar, in order to attract competent counsel to accept these types of cases. The facts surrounding counsel’s representation of Mr. Quinn in his action against the City of Los Angeles support the application of a multiplier of 2.0, in this Court’s discretion. Applying a multiplier of 2.0 yields total attorneys’ fees in the sum of $609,763.00.

V. The Attorneys’ Fees Sought by Plaintiff’s Counsel Are Well Within the Reasonable Range of Attorneys’ Fees Incurred in Employment Discrimination Actions.

An examination of the fee awards in recent employment discrimination cases litigated in California reveals that the fees sought by Plaintiff’s counsel in this case are well within the reasonable range of fees awarded in such cases. Plaintiff requests that the court take judicial notice of the following cases which provide a sampling of attorneys’ fee awards in employment discrimination actions:

In Crommie TA \s "Crommie" , supra, the Court awarded attorney’s fees in an age discrimination brought under the FEHA and the ADA in the amount of $637,440. In arriving at this figure, the Court applied a multiplier of 2.0. Id. at 726.

In Vibeke Cloud v. Western Atlas, Inc.; Litton Industries, Inc., LASC Case No. BC130079 (Dec. 23, 1997), a plaintiff who brought a gender discrimination action against her employer was awarded $400,819.71 in attorney’s fees and $20,114.15 in costs after achieving a verdict of $7,235.

In Keiffer v. Bechtel Corp., San Francisco Superior Court Case No. 974305 (February 25, 1997), a San Francisco Superior Court judge awarded the plaintiff $470,188 in attorney’s fees in an employment discrimination action. The court multiplied the attorney’s fees claimed by plaintiff’s counsel by three to arrive at the fee award.

A multiplier was also allowed in Green v. City of Los Angeles, LASC Case No. BC 111581 (October 9, 1996), where the court awarded $461,500 in attorney’s fees and over $35,000 in costs to a successful plaintiff in a race discrimination action against the Los Angeles Police Department. The court applied a multiplier of 2.0 in arriving at the fee award.

In a disability discrimination action in Sacramento, the Sacramento County Superior Court added almost $1,000,000 in attorneys’ fees, without the addition of a multiplier. Richards v. CH2M Hill, Sacramento Superior Court Case No. CV538663 (December 12, 1997).

· . Attorneys fees of $818,000 were awarded in a race discrimination action brought in the Los Angeles Superior Court. Hampton v. National Research Group, Inc., BC116069 (August 23, 1996).

VI. The Size of the Verdict Does Not Limit the Amount of Attorney’s Fees Properly Awardable Under the Civil Rights Statute.

An award of attorney’s fees in a civil rights case need not be proportional to the amount of the judgment. City of Riverside v. Rivera (1986) 477 U.S. 561, 574, 106 S.Ct. 2686, 2694, 91 L.Ed.2d 466 TA \l "City of Riverside v. Rivera

(1986) 477 U.S. 561, 106 S.Ct. 2686, 91 L.Ed.2d 466" \s "City of Riverside" \c 1 . Upholding an award of $245,456.25 in attorney’s fees to a plaintiff who had succeeded in obtaining a judgment of $33,350, the United States Supreme Court explained that:

"A rule of proportionality would make it difficult, if not impossible, for individuals with meritorious civil rights claims but relatively small potential damages to obtain redress from the courts. This is totally inconsistent with Congress’ purpose¼ . Congress recognized that private sector fee arrangements were inadequate to ensure sufficiently vigorous enforcement of civil rights. In order to ensure that lawyers would be willing to represent persons with legitimate civil rights grievances, Congress determined that it would be necessary to compensate lawyers for all time reasonably expended on a case."

Id. at 578, 106 S. Ct. at 2696 TA \s "City of Riverside" . The Court noted that results in a civil action for damages must be judged, at least in part, by the nonpecuniary public benefit of litigation. Id. 575, 106 S.Ct. at 2695 TA \s "City of Riverside" .

The cases are replete with instances in which the attorney’s fee award greatly exceeds the damages recovered by the prevailing plaintiff. See, e.g. Gomez v. Gates (C.D. Cal. 1992) 804 F. Supp. 69 TA \l "Gomez v. Gates

(C.D. Cal. 1992) 804 F. Supp. 69" \s "Gomez" \c 1 (upholding fee award of $378,175 where judgment in favor of plaintiff was $44,000); Wilcox v. City of Reno (9th Cir. 1994) 42 F.3d 550, 557 TA \l "Wilcox v. City of Reno

(9th Cir. 1994) 42 F.3d 550" \s "Wilcox" \c 1 (fee award of $66,535 affirmed when damages were only one dollar).

VII. Defendant Rejected Plaintiff’s Multitude of Attempts to Try to Resolve this Action Short of Litigation and Trial.

Plaintiff made every reasonable attempt to try to resolve this case without litigation, and prior to trial. Prior to filing the complaint, Plaintiff was required to and did file charges of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and the Department of Fair Employment and Housing ("DFEH"). The EEOC made a determination that the LAPD had discriminated against Plaintiff based on his disability in violation of the discrimination laws, and invited the parties to conciliate. A proposed settlement agreement was even provided based on the EEOC’s determination of what would constitute a reasonable settlement. The City refused to engage in conciliation efforts.

Thereafter, Plaintiff’s counsel suggested mediation of the dispute on several occasions throughout the litigation, from shortly after the complaint was filed until the week before trial. In every instance, these suggestions were ignored or rebuked by the City.

Plaintiff also served on the City a 998 offer to compromise in the amount of $199,999.99 in July, 1998, which would have included Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees and costs. The City ignored this offer.

Thus, Plaintiff was required to proceed with the litigation through trial and beyond. The City’s failure to even discuss settlement, or to accept a settlement offer which was patently reasonable given the outcome of the case, necessitated that a substantial investment of time be made by Plaintiff’s attorneys. The law requires counsel to be adequately compensated for that investment of time.

VIII. Conclusion.

The Law Offices of Paul A. Greenberg provided skilled, competent representation for Eugene Quinn in his action against the City of Los Angeles, and was able to achieve a successful verdict despite an uphill battle. An award of attorney’s fees in the amount of $609,763.00 is therefore appropriate.

DATED: December , 1998 LAW OFFICES OF PAUL A. GREENBERG

PAUL A. GREENBERG

IRIS WEINMANN

Attorneys for Plaintiff EUGENE QUINN

 

d:quinn/ motion for attorney’s fees

Declaration of Paul A. Greenberg

I, Paul A. Greenberg, declare and say as follows:

The Law Offices of Paul A. Greenberg, consisting of myself, Iris Weinmann and Josh Erlich is and has been at all times the attorney of record in the above entitled action. The statements made in this declaration are based on my personal knowledge, and if called as a witness, I could and would competently testify thereto under oath.

I received a B. A. with honors in 1971 from the University of Wisconsin. I received a Master of Arts with high honors in 1974 from the University of Colorado. I received a J. D. with honors from the University of Wisconsin in 1977. I became a member of the Bars of the states of Wisconsin and California in 1977.

I have practiced law in California since 1977. I have been a principal of the Law Offices of Paul A. Greenberg since 1981. I have been representing plaintiffs in employment litigation since 1983, when non-union employment law was in its infancy/toddler stage.

I represented an African-American plaintiff in an employment litigation case against a private employer beginning in 1982 or 1983 which culminated in a successful jury verdict in 1984. Since that time, I have increasingly concentrated my practice in the area of employment discrimination, representing employees only. For the past ten years, my practice has been almost exclusively dedicated to the representation of employees in discrimination and related employment claims.

Iris Weinmann began working for my firm in 1993 and has been exclusively associated with my firm since early 1994, also concentrating on employment litigation to the virtual exclusion of all other matters.

Iris Weinmann was admitted to the California State Bar in December, 1992, after receiving her Juris Doctor from Pepperdine University School of Law in 1992, where she graduated magna cum laude. Ms. Weinmann was a Dean’s Merit Scholar, and an associate editor of the Pepperdine Law Review. Two of her articles were published in the Pepperdine Law Review’s California Supreme Court Survey. Prior to entering law school, Ms. Weinmann was a Regents Scholar at the University of California, Los Angeles, where she received her undergraduate degree in economics/business in 1989. She graduated magna cum laude from UCLA, and is a member of Phi Beta Kappa.

Both Ms. Weinmann and I have for some time been active in LEFTJAW, the Los Angeles branch of the National Employment Lawyers Association (NELA). I am also a long time active member of the National Employment Lawyers Association and the California Employment Lawyers Association (CELA). I have been a speaker at the annual NELA conference and at the annual CELA conference as well as at other seminars and conferences. I was a speaker representing the plaintiff’s side on a television program entitled "Lawyers and the Law", which was moderated by Richard Riordan, who is now mayor of Los Angeles.

Josh Erlich is a 1996 graduate of Southwestern Law School, and was admitted to the California State Bar in December, 1996. He is also a member of the State Bar in Washington, D.C. He is a half time associate with my firm, but he works full time when we are in trial such as was the case in September and October when we were in trial on the case at issue.

I have been practicing as a litigation attorney in Los Angeles since 1977, and I have been concentrating on employment litigation since approximately 1983. As a result of my experience, I am aware of the prevailing hourly rates which have been charged by knowledgeable and experienced attorneys in the field of employment law in Los Angeles County. During the period from January 1, 1997 to the present those rates have ranged from approximately $200 per hour at the low end of the scale to approximately $450 per hour at the high end of the scale. The regular hourly rates I have charged for my services in this litigation, $350 per hour for myself, $220 per hour for Iris Weinmann, and $150 per hour for Josh Erlich, fall approximately in the middle to low end of this range and are amply justified by my knowledge and experience in the field as well as Iris Weinmann’s knowledge and experience in the field.

1.My paralegal, Debra Price, put many hundreds of hours into aiding the lawyers in my office in preparing this case. However, we have chosen not to request a reimbursement for Ms. Price’s hours even though that request would have been justified. Because we are not requesting any hourly fees for paralegal services, the hourly rates which we are charging for the attorneys in our office are actually over stated. The effective rates are less since Ms. Price’s hours are not being charged.

2.Because most individuals can not afford to pay for my representation in litigation on an hourly basis, I represent virtually all of my discrimination clients on a contingency fee basis. Pursuant to this arrangement, I am not compensated for my time unless I prevail at trial or successfully settle my client’s cases. Because I am taking the risk that I will not be reimbursed for my time unless my client settles or wins his or her case, I can not afford to represent an individual employee on a contingency basis if, at the end of my representation, all I am to receive is my regular hourly rate for my services. It is essential that I recover more than my regular hourly rate when I win if I am to remain in practice so as to be able to continue representing other individuals in civil rights employment disputes.

3.I undertook the representation of plaintiff Eugene Quinn in this litigation at great financial risk, because I believed that he had been seriously wronged and that his rights under the Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA"), Government Code §12900, et seq., had been violated. This case was especially poignant to me because Eugene Quinn, a man in his forties, had worked like the dickens to compete with young men twenty years his junior to pass the stringent physical requirements and examinations required to become a Los Angeles police officer. He had then spent over half a year of his life going through the equally stringent requirements of the Police Academy, graduating with an A average. Once he was on street patrol, he was, with no due process, removed from his patrol duties and then fired when the Los Angeles Police Department found that he had a hearing loss in one ear. Mr. Quinn had fully informed the police department of this when he applied, but this information was not recorded in his initial processing due to a "clerical error."

4.In undertaking Mr. Quinn’s representation, I knew that there would be a stringent defense put up by the police department, which felt that no one outside the department had the right to be involved in determining what physical requirements for a police officer should be imposed. I also knew that the department would play the "fear card" in its defense by arguing that if a hearing impaired individual were allowed to be a police officer, other officers and the public would be endangered. I also knew that Mr. Quinn would have a substantially uneven playing field in trying to put on evidence in that almost all the pertinent witnesses were still Los Angeles Police Department employees and would thus be reticent to testify against the department. This problem was compounded by the fact that, during litigation, I was not allowed to speak to any police officer witnesses or potential witnesses other than by way of deposition.

5.I am acquainted with many of the leading employment lawyers in California. I discussed the facts of this case with several of them. They were almost unanimous in advising me that it would be extremely difficult to prevail on this case due to the public safety issue the police department would raise and the historical difficulty in pursuing a case like this, as well as the difficulties of all disability discrimination plaintiffs in prevailing on their claims. Nonetheless, I felt that if I did not undertake Mr. Quinn’s representation that it was unlikely that his legitimate claims would go remedied. I therefore agreed to represent plaintiff on a contingency basis, knowing that in the absence of such an arrangement he would have been financially precluded from pursuing his claims.

6.At all times preceding and throughout the litigation, I undertook to resolve Mr. Quinn’s claim as expeditiously as possible. This began with Mr. Quinn’s EEOC and DFEH administrative filings. I guided Mr. Quinn into filing with the EEOC, which has a dispute resolution function. In fact, the EEOC did determine that Mr. Quinn had a claim which should be mediated. While Mr. Quinn and I actively participated with the EEOC in the attempt to secure mediation, the City of Los Angeles exhibited no interest in mediating through the EEOC. I then aided Mr. Quinn in drafting a very thorough government claim which we presented to the City of Los Angeles. We spent much time preparing this in order to try to show the City of Los Angeles that Mr. Quinn had a valid claim. However, the City of Los Angeles denied Mr. Quinn’s claim without comment and afforded us no ability to meet in order to demonstrate the validity of Mr. Quinn’s claim and explore options for resolution.

7.Finally, we had no choice but to file Mr. Quinn’s claim in Superior Court in order to prevent the statute of limitations from running on his claims. Even after we filed the complaint, I continued to explore attempts to resolve Mr. Quinn’s claim expeditiously. I spoke with the Assistant City Attorney litigating this case, Kristine Aronsohn. I urged her to recommend mediation to the City. However, the City ignored our requests and never expressed any interest whatsoever in mediating Mr. Quinn’s claims. Mr. Quinn even wrote personally to the Chief of Police regarding resolution of his claims, but without positive response.

8.The City finally became interested in trying to resolve Mr. Quinn’s claim on the night before trial of this matter! For the first time that night, the City made an offer to settle Mr. Quinn’s claim by offering him a City job connected to the police department and offering to pay his reasonable costs and attorney’s fees. Mr. Quinn was interested, and Ms. Weinmann and I therefore spent the first three days that had been scheduled for trial down in Court with the City Attorney and Judge Torres trying to arrange a settlement. However, at the end of the three day period, despite their commitment and Judge Torres’ efforts, the City was not willing to even pay Mr. Quinn’s costs in bringing this action, yet alone his attorney’s fees.

9.Throughout the litigation of this matter, Iris Weinmann and I undertook to cooperate with counsel for defendant in an effort to expedite and reduce the cost of the litigation. However, our attempts to expedite matters were met with stonewalling tactics on the part of the City. We were forced to engage in many needless hours of meet and confer letters and conferences with the City attempting to receive meaningful responses to discovery requests we propounded and then to file motions to compel the City’s compliance with discovery when our attempts to meet and confer failed. The City did not even feel compelled to have its officers who had been noticed for deposition show up for deposition on the noticed dates. We were forced to bring motions to compel just to take depositions of percipient witness police officers.

10.When the City ultimately was forced to comply with our discovery requests, it produced thousands of pages of documents, including many technical reports regarding hearing standards for law enforcement officers and studies throughout the nation. The review and analysis took us untold hours. We finally distilled the boxes of documents provided to us into ninety five (95) exhibits consisting of almost one thousand (1,000) pages.

11.In order to prepare for trial, I had to be intimately conversant with our exhibits. This was true because all of the information and procedures of the Los Angeles Police Department were kept proprietary to the police department until trial. We therefore had to put our case on through the department’s own exhibits and extensive cross-examination of department brass including commanders, its medical director and assistant medical director. In fact, our laborious examination and preparation of the documentation in this case was the key to the plaintiff prevailing in this case as we were able to show that the employment practices of the Los Angeles Police Department were not in compliance with the disability laws or with common sense or even with its own documentation.

12.Ms. Weinmann and I also spent many, many hours in locating, retaining and consulting with expert witnesses and preparing those experts who were retained for trial. Ultimately, three of the expert witnesses testified on plaintiff’s behalf at trial. Former police chief Mel Tucker provided crucial testimony to rebut the City’s argument that plaintiff was not qualified to be a police officer and that it could not reasonably accommodate plaintiff’s disability.

13.Both Ms. Weinmann and I appeared at all pre-trial and trial matters. Several days were spent in court supervised settlement conferences and pre-trial motions between September 23, 1998 and September 28, 1998. Jury selection began on September 29, and the verdict was reached on October 15, 1998. Ms. Weinmann and I were thus in court virtually continuously for an almost three week period of time. Our non-court time during this period was spent in coordination and preparation of witnesses, compilation of testimony and evidence introduced during trial, research of issues arising during trial and preparing for cross-examination of defense witnesses as well as examination of our own witnesses.

14.After the verdict, the City filed a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and a Motion for a New Trial. It also submitted a series of declarations from jurors. This required extensive post-trial time in opposing these motions and in contacting jurors and preparing counter declarations regarding the jury’s conduct. All the City’s motions were also defeated.

15.The nature of this case also required a very extensive commitment of time. Disability discrimination is perhaps the most uncertain area of employment law, already a complex area of the law. The disability laws are new and evolving. Further, there is tremendous amount of confusion regarding the interplay between the requirements of state disability laws under the Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA") and federal disability law requirements under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). In fact, defendant continuously submitted pleadings, instructions, verdict forms and arguments based on the federal ADA which had to be researched and rebutted even as we argued on plaintiff’s behalf that in most cases the controlling statute was the Fair Employment and Housing Act rather than the ADA.

16.The law is still not coherent or settled in the areas involved in this case, including the effect of probationary status on the disability laws, the reach of the "health and safety" and "essential duties" defenses given the particular facts of this case and the extent to which inconsistencies between different components of the Fair Employment and Housing Act and its defenses and between the Fair Employment and Housing Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) have never been resolved.

17.In short, we decided to represent Eugene Quinn because we knew it was the right thing to do even though we knew it would be difficult. The actions of the defendant in not reasonably attempting to settle this case and obstructing all of our efforts to litigate this case made this case as difficult as I had feared it might be to litigate. Once the defendant gave us no alternative but to litigate this case, we had no choice but to use our utmost skill and energies in asserting our client’s rightful positions. This required us to spend an inordinate amount of time both in legal research and on document review, analysis and presentation.

18.The requirements of this case were so demanding that I was unable to deal with any other matters in my busy practice for over a one month period of time to the detriment of other cases I had pending. I have been prohibited from considering taking any new matters for a substantial period of time.

19.In fact, cases such as this are so demanding that I can only accept a handful of such cases per year. Even so, my office is virtually paralyzed during the immediate pre-trial, trial and post-trial period, such as with this action.

20.At the trial of this action, plaintiff prevailed on the claim submitted to the jury for determination: disability discrimination. He was awarded a substantial sum of money ($200,000) by the jury to compensate him for the economic and emotional distress damages he sustained as a result of defendant’s unlawful conduct towards him.

21.In the face of defendant’s refusal to enter into good faith discussions with plaintiff regarding resolution of this case, plaintiff decided to make a reasonable good faith CCP §998 offer of settlement in an effort to resolve this case. Plaintiff thus made a CCP §998 unequivocal offer of compromise of this case for the sum of $199,999.99. The reasonableness of this offer can be found in the jury verdict which granted plaintiff more than his offer by one penny! Of course, defendant, upon hearing the jury’s reaction to its conduct, did not show any interest in resolving the case on a post-trial basis. Rather, it has so far filed three different motions, two of which have already been defeated and one of which is pending, along with several declarations by jurors and one declaration by an investigator which is one hundred percent (100%) hearsay. All this activity, of course, requires corresponding amounts of time to be spent by us in opposing said motions and responding to said declarations.

22.Attached hereto as Exhibits "A", "B" and "C" are true and correct copies of the billing statements my office prepared accurately itemizing the time charges billed by me, Ms. Weinmann, and Mr. Erlich, respectively, in our representation of plaintiff in this case. Following is a breakdown showing how these hours were spent:

Pre-Litigation Hours: (Includes Exhausting Administrative Remedies, and Preparing and Filing Complaint)

Attorney

Time Billed

Hourly Rate

Total

Paul A. Greenberg

25.90

$350

$9065.00

Iris Weinmann

19.50

$220

$4290.00

Josh Erlich

0

$150

0

Pre-Trial Litigation Hours:

Discovery (Includes Propounding and Responding to Discovery, Preparing For, Attending, and Conducting Depositions, Engaging in Meet and Confer Process, and Filing Motions to Compel):

Attorney

Time Billed

Hourly Rate

Total

Paul A. Greenberg

47.60

$350

$16,660.00

Iris Weinmann

102.90

$220

$22,638.00

Josh Erlich

16.90

$150

$2535.00

Trial Preparation (Includes Time Spent Preparing Pre Trial Documents, Such as Jury Instructions, Witness Lists, Exhibit Lists, Trial Brief, etc. and Preparing for Jury Selection, Opening Statement, etc.)

Attorney

Time Billed

Hourly Rate

Total

Paul A. Greenberg

139.30

$350

$48,755.00

Iris Weinmann

163.90

$220

$36,058.00

Josh Erlich

30.10

$150

$4515.00

Other Pre-Litigation (Includes Miscellaneous Time Such as Opposing Demurrer, Conducting Research, Locating and Retaining Experts, and Court Appearances for Settlement Conferences and Pre-Trial Motions)

Attorney

Time Billed

Hourly Rate

Total

Paul A. Greenberg

38.80

$350

$13,580.00

Iris Weinmann

55.15

$220

$12,133.00

Josh Erlich

36.80

$150

$5520.00

Trial Hours: (Includes Court Time in Trial and Trial Preparation)

Attorney

Time Billed

Hourly Rate

Total

Paul A. Greenberg

197.30

$350

$69,055.00

Iris Weinmann

143.00

$220

$31,460.00

Josh Erlich

3.50

$150

$525.00

Post-Trial Hours: (Includes Opposing Defendant’s Motion for New Trial and Motion for JNOV, and Preparing Memorandum of Costs)

Attorney

Time Billed

Hourly Rate

Total

Paul A. Greenberg

35.20

$350

$12,320.00

Iris Weinmann

33.50

$220

$7370.00

Josh Erlich

6.80

$150

$1020.00

Fee Application Hours: (Includes Time Spent in Researching and Drafting This Motion for Attorney’s Fees - Does Not Include Time to Prepare Reply Brief or to Appear at Hearing)

Attorney

Time Billed

Hourly Rate

Total

Paul A. Greenberg

11.35

$350

$3972.50

Iris Weinmann

15.50

$220

$3410.00

Josh Erlich

0

$150

0

Thus, prior to the application of a multiplier, the bill for our attorney services, exclusive of costs, totals $304,881.50.

A multiplier of 2 should appropriately be applied to the balance of the fees incurred by plaintiff in his prosecution of his claims in this litigation to compensate his attorneys for the risks we undertook in his representation, the delay we incurred and continue to incur in being paid for our services, the preclusion of our accepting other legal work during the pendency of this case, and to provide other competent specialists in the field of employment law an inducement to represent similarly deserving clients whose claims would otherwise go unrepresented. Unless such a multiplier is applied, this case, even though successful, will provide a further reason for plaintiffs’ attorneys to shy away from the representation of individuals in discrimination actions against large employers and public entities.

I was co-trial counsel with Lawrence Grassini in an age discrimination case that we successfully tried to verdict. Mr. Grassini had previously been awarded attorney’s fees under the Fair Employment and Housing Act at the hourly rate of $450 per hour. This hourly rate was specifically approved in the case of Bihun TA \s "Bihun" v. AT&T Information Systems, Inc. (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 976, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 787. Although Mr. Grassini had approximately five years of seniority on me at the time we tried that trial, I now have been practicing law in California for as many years as he had practiced when his hourly rate of $450 per hour was sanctioned. Further, while Mr. Grassini is preeminent in the field as a plaintiffs’ trial attorney, I have more specialized experience than he does as a plaintiffs’ civil rights attorney. I do not mean to suggest that my time should be compensated as highly as his. However, I do think it is reasonable to suggest that if his hourly rate of $450 an hour was reasonable in 1993, then my hourly rate of $350 per hour is reasonable in 1998.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this ______ day of December, 1998 at Los Angeles, California.

 

PAUL A. GREENBERG

 

 

 

 

 

 

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

EUGENE F. QUINN,

Plaintiff,

vs.

CITY OF LOS ANGELES, a Municipal Corporation; and DOES 1 through 50, Inclusive,

Defendants.

)

)

)

No. BC176333

(Case Assigned to Hon. Ricardo Torres)

NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES AND DECLARATION OF PAUL A. GREENBERG IN SUPPORT THEREOF

[Declarations of Stuart P. Herman, Fred T. Ashley, Joseph Posner and Virgil L. Roth & Appendix of Federal Authority Filed Concurrently Herewith]

 

 

DATE: January 19, 1999

TIME: 8:30 a.m.

DEPT: 64

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TOC \O "1-3" MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 2

I. Introduction. 2

II. Plaintiff Is Entitled To His Attorney’s Fees As The Prevailing Party In This Litigation. 2

III. The Lodestar Value of the Attorney’s Fees Incurred Has Been Appropriately Established. 3

A. The Number of Hours Expended by Plaintiff’s Counsel Was Reasonable. 3

B. The Hourly Rate Charged for the Services of Plaintiff’s Counsel is Reasonable. 8

IV. Under California Law, a Multiplier of the Lodestar May Be Awarded To Account for the Successful Result and the Contingent Risk of Litigation. 9

V. The Attorneys’ Fees Sought by Plaintiff’s Counsel Are Well Within the Reasonable Range of Attorneys’ Fees Incurred in Employment Discrimination Actions. 11

VI. The Size of the Verdict Does Not Limit the Amount of Attorney’s Fees Properly Awardable Under the Civil Rights Statute. 12

VII. Defendant Rejected Plaintiff’s Multitude of Attempts to Try to Resolve this Action Short of Litigation and Trial. 13

VIII. Conclusion. 14

DECLARATION OF PAUL A. GREENBERG 15

 

 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

TOA \h \c "1" Cases

Beasley v. Wells Fargo Bank

(1991) 235 Cal. App. 3d 1407, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 459 10

Bihun v. AT&T Information Systems, Inc.

(1993) 13 Cal. App. 4th 976, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 787 8, 25

Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC

(1978) 434 U.S. 412, 98 S. Ct. 694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 3

City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders

(1988) 203 Cal. App. 3d 78, 249 Cal. Rptr. 606 9

City of Riverside v. Rivera

(1986) 477 U.S. 561, 106 S.Ct. 2686, 91 L.Ed.2d 466 12, 13

Crommie v. California Public Utilities Comm’n

(N.D. Cal. 1994) 840 F. Supp. 719 3, 8, 11

Cummings v. Benco Bldg. Services

(1992) 11 Cal. App. 4th 1383, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 53 3

Downey Cares v. Downey Community Dev. Comm’n

(1987) 196 Cal. App. 3d 983, 242 Cal. Rptr. 272 9

Gomez v. Gates

(C.D. Cal. 1992) 804 F. Supp. 69 13

Margolin v. Regional Planning Comm’n

(1982) 134 Cal. App. 3d 999, 185 Cal. Rptr. 145 7

New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey

(1980) 447 U.S. 54, 100 S.Ct. 2024, 64 L.Ed.2d 723 4

Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc.

(1983) 34 Cal. 3d 311, 193 Cal. Rptr. 900 3, 9

San Bernardino Valley Audubon Society v. County of San Bernardino

(1984) 155 Cal. App. 3d 738, 202 Cal. Rptr. 423 11

Serrano v. Priest (Serrano III)

(1977) 20 Cal. 3d 25, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315 3, 9

Serrano v. Unruh (Serrano IV)

(1982) 32 Cal. 3d 621, 186 Cal. Rptr. 754 4

Stokus v. Marsh

(1990) 217 Cal. App. 3d 647, 266 Cal. Rptr. 90 4

Wilcox v. City of Reno

(9th Cir. 1994) 42 F.3d 550 13

TOA \h \c "2" Statutes

Gov’t Code §12965(b). 2